United Nations A/C.1/50/PV.15

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First Committee
15th Meeting
Tuesday, 7 November 1995, 3 p.m.
New York

Chairman: Mr. Erdenechuluun . . . . . (Mongolia)

The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

Agenda items 57 to 81 *(continued)*

Consideration of draft resolutions submitted under all disarmament and international security agenda items

The Chairman: I call on the representative of Egypt to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.10.

Mr. Elaraby (Egypt): As this is my first statement following the tragic assassination of the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. Yitzhak Rabin, I should like to convey to the delegation of Israel the deepest condolences of the delegation of Egypt. The peace camp in the Middle East has lost a courageous champion. The whole world has expressed the hope that the assassination will add momentum to the peace process and will make the supporters of peace more determined. This message was clearly conveyed by President Mubarak to the world leaders gathered at the funeral when he said:

> "Only through our unwavering commitment to this objective can we truly honour the memory of this fallen hero of peace."

President Mubarak continued:

> "We must therefore redouble our efforts and reaffirm our obligation to continue the sacred mission to achieve a just and lasting peace."

It is my pleasure to introduce the draft resolution on agenda item 66. This item was inscribed in the agenda in 1974, at the request of Iran with the support of Egypt, and Egypt has traditionally sponsored the draft resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. The draft for this session is contained in document A/C.1/50/L.10 of 3 November 1995.

The atmosphere prevailing in the Middle East today requires that the efforts of the international community to enhance the peace process through the early establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region and to take all possible steps towards the eventual realization of a Middle East free of all weapons of mass destruction be harnessed and consolidated. In this context, it should be recalled that President Mubarak was the first to launch an initiative on the question of freeing the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction — doing do in April 1990. The establishment of such a zone would undoubtedly generate the necessary conditions for enhancing peace and stability in the region.

For many years, Egypt has conducted extensive consultations with all regional partners, as well as with extraregional parties involved in the Middle East peace process. Egypt has submitted several proposals in all relevant forums, at the regional and international levels, with a view to advancing specific arrangements that could contribute to the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region. The latest of these initiatives was in the framework of the multilateral Middle East peace process, where we presented several proposals, in the context of the Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security, concerning provisions and elements related to the establishment of such a zone.

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I find it necessary to recall here that for many years — since 1980, in fact — all the parties and all members of the General Assembly, including Israel, have accepted the principle of establishing the zone. Year in and year out, the draft resolution is adopted by consensus. The position adopted by Israel throughout these years has been that such a zone could be established only through direct negotiations between the parties concerned. We were happy to accommodate this position, and direct negotiations began more than three years ago in the context of the Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security.

However, up to now all efforts to achieve meaningful results have been unsuccessful. Israel blocked any serious consideration of the issue, holding it hostage to certain preconditions revolving round the undefined notion of "peace and reconciliation" with all the States of the region. We sincerely hope that this proposition is not a delaying tactic and that all the parties will be able to work together to achieve the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

In order to clarify this point further, allow me to address four specific issues: first of all, the time-frame. My delegation believes that the negotiations of the Arms Control and Regional Security Working Group should be directed towards a comprehensive examination of all the related aspects of establishing the zone. We accept the argument that the required examination of modalities may prove to be time-consuming, but the point to be emphasized is the initiation phase. This phase is now — and not, as the representative of Israel said a few days ago in the First Committee:

> "the day when conditions in the region will be auspicious for the launching of discussions on a nuclear-weapon-free zone". (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Fiftieth Session, First Committee, 8th meeting, p. 4*)

The second point is the relation between peace and security. Our position on this point is that total and comprehensive peace requires taking into consideration in a reciprocal manner the legitimate security concerns of all the parties — and not, I repeat not, the concern of one party at the expense of other parties. In this respect, I should like to stress that the security concerns of the Arab States, as a result of the existing Israeli unsafeguarded, and, I would add, aging nuclear capabilities, are far greater than any Israeli security concern with respect to the Arab States.

The third point is the territorial scope of the nuclear-weapon-free zone, and this is a point of great importance. Who are the parties concerned? The answer to this question emanates from the scope of application of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), in which the Council called on the parties to work out security arrangements together. That resolution was addressed to the States involved in the 1967 hostilities. It is generally recognized that Iran is within the geographical definition of the Middle East region. However, it has to be pointed out that the territorial scope of such a zone could not be artificially extended to include many countries that are beyond the well-established definition of the Middle East.

The fourth point is the relation to the peace process. My delegation maintains the view that establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East is one of the prerequisites for a successful peace process. The establishment of such a zone should be an integral component of the peace equation.

In this context, we are ready to consider what was stated by the Secretary-General in the last paragraph of his report on this agenda item:

> "In my view, progress on steps towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should neither lead nor lag behind inter-State negotiations on the broader aspects of a peace settlement. Rather, the two should proceed in parallel." (*A/48/399, para 22*)

It is for this reason that the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons devoted a special resolution to the Middle East, as a clear indication of the serious concern of these States over the situation in our region, resulting — as stated in operative paragraph 3 of that resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference — from

> "the continued existence in the Middle East of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities". (*NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), annex, Resolution on the Middle East, para. 3*)

The decision stated further, in operative paragraph 5:

> "Calls upon all States in the Middle East to take practical steps in appropriate forums aimed at making progress towards, *inter alia*, the establishment of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and

biological, and their delivery systems, and to refrain from taking any measures that preclude the achievement of this objective." (*NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I), annex, Resolution on the Middle East, para. 5*)

Regrettably, and notwithstanding the aforementioned developments, and notwithstanding also the principles and provisions of relevant and successive General Assembly resolutions since 1974, the establishment of the zone remains unrealized. We, in turn, ask how many more years, and how many more resolutions, do we need to implement the initiative to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East?

We note that since 1980 this resolution has been adopted both in the First Committee and in the General Assembly by consensus. Consensus, no doubt, entails a commitment to work on the basis of the resolution and not to present differing interpretations to block its practical implementation. The so-called "step-by-step approach" — beginning with confidence-building and security measures, establishing peaceful relations and, after establishing peaceful relations, in due course complementing the process by dealing with conventional and non-conventional arms control where appropriate — is not acceptable to the Arab States. There is a need for mutual consideration of the priorities, with a view to achieving lasting peace in the Middle East.

In introducing this draft resolution, which is an updated version of last year's resolution, the delegation of Egypt exercised the utmost self-restraint and refrained from adding new paragraphs reflecting the concerns to which I have alluded in the course of this statement.

Our objective, and our most sincere hope, is to maintain the existing consensus on the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone, thus allowing more time for the reconsideration of positions. Lest I be misunderstood, by "more time" we mean the next few months — and I will refer to this in a moment.

All the concerned parties within the Middle East region, that is, Iran, Israel and the Arab States, should engage seriously, and without any further delay, in negotiating the practical arrangements for the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone within the forthcoming year.

Let me add that this year the First Committee is going to adopt a draft resolution with an annex on the African nuclear-weapon-free zone. In that draft resolution, there is more than one reference to the importance of achieving as soon as possible another zone free from nuclear weapons in the Middle East. The hope of my delegation is that as we are adopting this year the resolution on the African zone, we will be able by next year to adopt a resolution on the Middle East zone, and I think the political atmosphere is very auspicious. If we have the will, we shall be able to undertake this very important task.

The Chairman: I now call on the representative of Mali, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.29.

Mr. Diawara (Mali) (*interpretation from French*): At the outset, on behalf of my delegation, I wish to convey to the Israeli delegation our deepest condolences on the loss of their Prime Minister, Mr. Yitzhak Rabin.

I have the honour and pleasure to introduce to this Committee draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.29, on behalf of its sponsors. The purpose of this text is to assist States in curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them. As members can see, it is sponsored by 21 countries, whose legitimate aspirations accord with those of other Member States of the international community in the face of a global phenomenon that is growing day by day.

I must say, however, that this draft resolution is not only the draft of its sponsors. The draft is ours — that of all the States represented here, which, with much clear-sightedness, adopted it last year by consensus.

It is precisely this concern for consensus that prevailed in the drafting of the version that is submitted for the Committee's consideration, and that is why this version is almost unchanged compared to resolution 49/75 G of 15 December 1995. The slight changes in format made to the draft are intended mainly to bring the document up to date, taking account of the time that has elapsed since the last session. Indeed, following the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 49/75 G, the Secretary-General of the United Nations undertook to implement that resolution by dispatching an advisory mission to those countries most affected by the volume of illicit traffic in small arms.

The draft before us takes this evolution into account and attempts to reflect it in the preamble as well as in the operative section. However, it has an additional operative paragraph 4 that conforms with the title of the draft resolution. In this paragraph the Secretary-General is requested to provide the requisite assistance for the implementation in the countries concerned of the relevant

recommendations contained in the report of these advisory missions. We feel, therefore, that it is logical to ensure the implementation of these recommendations so that observations on the ground may be followed up with concrete measures in order to contain the scourge of the accumulation, circulation and illicit export of small arms in our subregion.

It has been recognized that the issue of small arms is today a global scourge, and we would agree. But we also need to recognize that the situation in our countries is a very specific one, because it relates to their existence as independent and sovereign States. Indeed, the survival of these States and of the new institutions that most of them have established, or are in the process of establishing, will depend on their ability to guarantee the safety of their populations through the maintenance of internal security.

We need also to recognize the specific nature of the situation in our countries because these are countries with very limited resources, most of which are unable to preserve their own stability in the face of any group that is equipped with a stockpile of small arms. In Africa, armies can change the course of history in a country simply by acting on motives far removed from the real concerns of the peoples. That is certainly one characteristic peculiar to Africa — a sad one, I must admit.

It is thus urgent for the international community to establish a code of conduct by creating the appropriate mechanisms to curb the illicit traffic in small arms. The lack of security and the tragedies that we are seeing throughout the world are primarily due to this illicit traffic in small arms, which provides a comfortable existence for some at the expense of the blood and tears of millions of men, women and children. That is the thrust of our invitation to the international community, contained in operative paragraph 7, to give appropriate support to the efforts made by the affected countries to check the illicit circulation of small arms, which is likely to hamper their development.

Thus, the support of representatives for the draft resolution will be concrete evidence of international solidarity with our countries, which today are firmly committed to broad restructuring programmes, both political and economical. In this context, peace and security will be their most valuable assets.

The Chairman: I now call on the representative of Canada, who will introduce the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/50/L.12, A/C.1/50/L.14 and A/C.1/50/L.15.

Mr. Moher (Canada): I wish to speak at the outset to three draft resolutions that have been submitted to this Committee, and with your indulgence, Sir, I will speak later on a fourth.

With regard to the first draft resolution — in document A/C.1/50/L.12 — on "Verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification", I wish first of all to acknowledge the long-standing view of this Committee of the critical nature of verification. In fact, in another draft resolution that is before this Committee — draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.42 — there is a paragraph in which the General Assembly would welcome the universal recognition of the critical importance of the question of compliance with, and verification of, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and other obligations.

We fully agree with that, and, given the critical importance of verification, it is in our view necessary to keep the field under constant review and to examine new ideas and developments, to ensure that our knowledge is up to date and to draw on those reflections as much as possible and when appropriate.

The basis for the study that is before this Committee in document A/50/377, which is the background to our draft resolution, is resolution 48/68 of December 1993. Some 127 States supported that resolution; it had 22 sponsors. Pursuant to that resolution, experts from 16 countries participated in the two-year study, which, unanimously, sets out a number of concepts and recommendations for consideration by Member States.

In preparing draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.12, Canada devoted major efforts to meeting all the concerns expressed by various members of this Committee in an effort to find a true consensus. We continue to be mildly bemused by those who continue to find difficulty with our final effort.

What does this draft resolution do? The preambular paragraphs affirm the Committee's continued support for the 16 principles of verification drawn up by the Disarmament Commission and stress the critical importance of verification and compliance, echoing a comment I made a few minutes ago.

In operative paragraph 1 the General Assembly would note the report of the Secretary-General and commend it to

the attention of Member States — hardly a provocative provision. In operative paragraph 2 it would request the Secretary-General to give the report the widest possible circulation and to seek the views of Member States. In operative paragraph 3 Member States would be encouraged to consider the recommendations contained in the report and to assist the Secretary-General in their implementation where they consider it appropriate. The Secretary-General is requested to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-second session — two sessions from now.

What the draft resolution does not do is endorse all of the recommendations contained in the report, direct any specific endorsement of ideas or mandate the expenditure of resources.

We regret and apologize for the fact that, in our effort to meet the official deadline of Friday evening, we were unable to contact all delegations that had expressed support for this draft resolution, and we were therefore unable to give all of them the chance to sponsor it, as they had indicated they would like to do. In introducing this draft resolution to the Committee today, I welcome the support of all delegations, including any additional sponsorship.

Turning to draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.14, entitled "Status of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction", it is worth recalling that in November 1992 resolution 47/39 was adopted without a vote. Thus, on a consensus basis, it commended the Convention, called upon all States to sign it, expressed the intention to bring it into force at the earliest date and called upon all States to ensure its effective implementation.

During the past two years, discussions — frequently difficult, we admit — have taken place at The Hague. These discussions should and will continue. We hope for an early conclusion. That, however, is the proper forum for the substantive discussion of issues relating to this Convention.

At the same time, it is worth emphasizing that nearly 50 States have already ratified the Convention, bringing it closer to entry into force, and Canada, for one, sees this as a highly positive development.

Against this background, Canada and Poland are proposing the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.14, now before this Committee. We consider it to be procedural, as it does not try in any way to shift the balance on substantive issues or to advance any substantive point of view. In operative paragraph 1 it merely welcomes the work done so far by the Preparatory Commission at The Hague and urges the early completion of this work. In operative paragraph 2 it urges States to sign the Convention, and in operative paragraph 3 it stresses the particular importance of its early entry into force, urging States, particularly those possessing chemical weapons, to ratify it as soon as possible.

Canada and Poland believe that this draft resolution can be strongly supported by all members of this Committee. We have almost 50 sponsors at this time, and we have welcomed indications of additional support. I recommend this draft resolution for careful consideration by all delegations, as we would like it to be a true consensus resolution.

Turning to draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.15, "Prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices", I would again like to begin by briefly reviewing the history of this issue.

The concept has been discussed for almost 40 years. It has roots in both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. The concept has been widely supported for many years, but it was not until the early 1990s that we in the international community were finally able to begin to make substantive progress. Resolution 47/39 of December 1992, a consensus resolution, launched the process, and there has been further progress since then. The Conference on Disarmament decided that it was the appropriate forum in which to pursue the issue, and it adopted the report of its Special Coordinator on this issue in March 1995. The Conference on Disarmament also decided to establish an ad hoc committee to initiate negotiations on the basis of that report.

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.15, now before this Committee, is entirely factual and does not attempt to address the substance of this issue, which will require careful negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament. Therefore, in operative paragraph 1 it merely welcomes the establishment by the Conference on Disarmament at its 1995 session of an ad hoc committee to negotiate a treaty — a statement of fact. It encourages and supports the efforts of Member States and Observers to the Conference on Disarmament to obtain the immediate commencement and early conclusion of such negotiations. Finally, it decides to place this issue on the agenda of the General Assembly at its fifty-first session.

I think the draft resolution clearly recognizes that negotiations on this issue should get under way in 1996. It has strong support already, and we would welcome additional support.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of the Committee for the careful attention that I hope all will give to these three draft resolutions.

The Chairman: I now call on the representative of Mexico, who will introduce draft resolutions A/C.1/50/L.2 and A/C.1/50/L.32.

Mr. de Icaza (Mexico) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Before I turn to the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/50/L.2 and A/C.1/50/L.32, allow me to make a few brief comments on draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.12, which has just been introduced by Canada. Verification is an essential component in the arms limitation and disarmament programme. Adequate and satisfactory verification of international agreements is essential for creating an environment of trust and security. When verification is multilateral, it offers an additional element of trust because of its independence and impartiality, in particular for countries which lack the national means independently to verify compliance by other States with their obligations.

The international environment is, at present, conducive to the development of cooperation activities and to the strengthening of the capacity of the United Nations in areas promoting collective peace and security. The document prepared by the Group of Governmental Experts on Verification shows us that the participation of the United Nations in this area can be quite varied, but so far it is limited. The practical examples of verification known to us show that if there are too many organizations involved in these efforts, resources may well be wasted and mismanaged. The States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention are attempting to set up the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which will be entrusted with the task of verifying compliance with the regime established pursuant to the Convention. This process has not been easy and has been very costly. The lack of experience in establishing this kind of verification mechanism and the reticence still felt by some States are facts. However, it is hoped that we can lay the groundwork for the development of a "verification culture", which in the near future would lead to the establishment of a multilateral body to which States parties to a treaty could entrust the task of verifying compliance with its provisions.

Similarly, it will soon be necessary to set up a body to verify compliance with a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and there will be other requirements such as verification of the prohibition of biological weapons, of the production of fissile material for the manufacturing of nuclear weapons as well as other kinds of activities relating to various aspects of verification. The United Nations can play a decisive role, not only as a coordinator and information centre, but also in terms of gathering its own experience and passing it on to others.

The development of common verification services is the first step in a process which should lead to the creation of a United Nations body responsible for verification in all its aspects. This process will also help to fine tune and establish new technologies in this field, which may well benefit countries with fewer possibilities for allocating resources to this kind of research.

Verification is an evolving activity and our concept of this process today is broad in scope and content. The combination of various technologies, some of them involving advanced technologies, make verification today a much more reliable and viable activity. The suggestions made by the Group of Governmental Experts for the establishment of new principles and guidelines in the area of verification are particularly timely at this stage because they respond to new needs which we must satisfy.

We trust that the contributions made by Member States to the report submitted by the Secretary-General will round off the efforts made by the Group of Governmental Experts. This may well be considered as a step forward in our common task. We extend our thanks to the Chairman of the Group of Governmental Experts, Ambassador Peggy Mason of Canada, for the work carried out and the tenacity and efficiency with which she guided the work. We would also like to express our gratitude to the United Nations Centre for Disarmament Affairs, in particular for the work carried out by the Secretary of the Group, Mrs. Olga Sukovitch.

My delegation supports draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.12 and will vote in favour of it if a vote is needed, but we feel that it deserves to be adopted by the First Committee by consensus.

Allow me now to move on to draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.2. Two years ago, my delegation submitted a draft resolution in which the Secretary-General was requested to prepare a brief report on the question of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of

vehicles for their delivery so that a representative governmental group of experts could consider it and make suggestions on future consideration of the report in the various multilateral disarmament forums. The report was drafted, but for various reasons it was not transmitted to a representative group of experts, which, as was said at the time, might well have been the Conference on Disarmament. This exercise has therefore remained incomplete. We understand the reasons for the interpretations which prevented the draft from being put forward in 1994 but we feel that the extreme importance of this issue should prompt us to seek the necessary means to ensure its completion.

My delegation feels that the need to deal with the question of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their delivery vehicles in all its aspects is a constant concern in the various multilateral disarmament forums, and the interest of countries in its various aspects is quite evident. If we are going to have universal and non-discriminatory mechanisms then we need to discuss issues such as the review of recent developments in arms limitation and disarmament and the potential for progress, the verification of non-proliferation regimes, the role of sanctions in these regimes and trade in technology and dual-use materials, to mention but a few.

Mexico is convinced that a multilateral approach to consideration of the question of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the most appropriate tack to take because the States it concerns would be involved. The drafting and strengthening of the international standards on weapons of mass destruction and of their delivery vehicles should be treated as a priority.

The efforts made by the international community to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their delivery vehicles are quite evident. We have noted this in the work of the Security Council quite often and we saw it for real during the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In the final analysis, the indefinite extension of that Treaty is just one means among others of achieving this general objective.

The various international treaties in force on weapons of mass destruction are involved in a dynamic process of review and that means that we need constantly to consider ways to improve their functioning. That is the case for the NPT and at the most recent Review and Extension Conference, States parties decided to carry out a nuclear disarmament programme and to set up a mechanism for improving review of the Treaty. The Biological Weapons Convention is also being analysed in depth. These activities are and will continue to be the fruit of decisions adopted during negotiations in the multilateral forums and not just the efforts of some States.

For these reasons, my delegation is submitting draft decision A/C.1/50/L.2 to ensure that the item remains on the agenda of the General Assembly and we look forward to the Committee's support so that we can continue our consideration of this important subject.

We now move on to draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.32. My delegation is pleased to introduce for the First Committee's consideration this draft resolution entitled "Amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water", on behalf of Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Nigeria, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, the United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela and Mexico.

The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty continues to be one of the greatest priorities for the international community as a means to halt the sophistication of nuclear weapons and to promote nuclear disarmament within the process of achieving the complete elimination of this category of weapon of mass destruction. Last year, the Conference on Disarmament established an Ad Hoc Committee mandated to negotiate and conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty. During the Review and Extension Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the nuclear-weapon States reiterated their commitment to conclude a comprehensive ban no later than 1996. Undeniable progress has been made to date in the negotiations on various substantive areas of the rolling text. The magnitude of the remaining task, however, requires us to redouble our efforts and to intensify the negotiations to achieve the objective within the agreed time-frame.

At the same time, the States parties to the partial test-ban Treaty are continuing to work actively towards the prompt conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Consultations are being pursued on the progress achieved in the negotiations and they have not ruled out a reconvening of the Amendment Conference some time in the future. The Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Ambassador Alatas, in his capacity as President of that Conference, has been mandated to pursue consultations to that end, since, as was established at one meeting:

"The work of the Amendment Conference must continue alongside the work of the Conference on Disarmament for a comprehensive test ban, so that they can be mutually supportive and complementary."

The draft resolution before us this year varies in length and content from that submitted last year. It contains five preambular paragraphs that incorporate the main ideas and objectives of the initiative that first led a group of countries, including my own, to submit it several years ago. In the operative part, States that have not already done so are urged to adhere to the partial test-ban Treaty. States parties to the Treaty are urged to contribute to the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty as soon as possible and no later than 1996 and to its expeditious entry into force. The President of the Amendment Conference is requested to conduct consultations to those ends and it is decided to include this item in the provisional agenda of the fifty-first session of the General Assembly.

The sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.32 are convinced of the importance of keeping the path of the Amendment Conference open as a precaution in the event — which we hope will not come to pass — that the efforts to achieve a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty do not achieve the success we all hope for. As in previous years, we hope that this initiative will enjoy the broadest support in the First Committee.

Mr. Jusuf (Indonesia): My delegation would like to associate itself with the statement made by Ambassador Antonio de Icaza of Mexico when he introduced the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/50/L.32 concerning the amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water. My delegation is pleased to be one of the sponsors of that draft resolution.

We are gratified to note that the question of the amendment of the partial test-ban Treaty is again featured in our agenda. As members may recall, under the mandate entrusted to him, the President of the Amendment Conference has continued the consultation in moving towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which is our common goal. These endeavours have been undertaken in the context of the mutually supportive and complementary efforts of the Conference on Disarmament. It is of the utmost importance that the momentum generated by the Review and Extension Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which called for the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty no later than 1996, should be seized and should respond positively to the collective will of the international community for a permanent ban on nuclear testing.

After years of frustrating and sterile controversy, there is a consensus among Member States belonging to various regions that the time is long overdue for renewed and determined action to realize the goal of banning all nuclear tests in all environments and for all time. It is therefore critical that talks should proceed rapidly towards the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In this, the role of the vast majority of non-nuclear States should not be marginalized. Rather, these States should be allowed to make their contribution to the achievement of the long-sought goal.

It is also essential that, in addressing this question, we bear in mind the developments, both positive and negative, that have taken place and which have a profound bearing on this question. Similarly, we should also like to take into account the consultations of the President of the Amendment Conference to address relevant questions and to explore the possibility of a broad consensus on specific steps leading to the reconvening of the Amendment Conference. In this context, we welcome operative paragraph 3, which requests the President of the Amendment Conference to conduct consultations with the sole objective of contributing to the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty as soon as possible.

In conclusion, my delegation is confident that, through such an approach, we can move closer to realizing the objective that we set more than three decades ago.

The Chairman: I now call on the representative of Japan, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.17.

Mrs. Kurokochi (Japan): I should like to say a few words in introduction of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.17, entitled "Nuclear disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons".

Last year, at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, Japan introduced a draft resolution under the same title and it was adopted by an overwhelming majority. We believe that that resolution contributed to the reaching of an agreement on the extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), because its most important concept, which was embodied in its title, was reflected in the Principles and Objectives adopted at the NPT Review and Extension Conference.

This year, Japan is sponsoring a draft resolution with the same title as a follow-up to last year's resolution, taking into account the results of the NPT Review and Extension Conference. The content of this year's draft resolution is similar to that of its predecessor, except for references to the results of the said Conference and for operative paragraph 2.

Japan strongly hopes that during this fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations the international community will show clear determination in pursuit of disarmament. We would like this draft resolution to be adopted without a vote, if possible, or by a large majority.

Mr. Boros (Hungary): I should like to associate my delegation — as a co-sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.12 on verification in all its aspects, including the role of the United Nations in the field of verification — with the statement made by the representative of Canada. A Hungarian expert also participated in the elaboration of the study mentioned and we consider that the experts have done good work.

One of the most important questions we deal with in various disarmament forums is that of verification. We have verification systems of different efficacy attached to a lot of treaties and we are working on some very important ones, for example in Geneva. We think that the study is an important contribution to these questions. The recommendations and their implementation, where it is appropriate, can contribute to confidence building and security. That is why Hungary is a co-sponsor of the draft resolution.

We believe that knowing the views of Member States on the study and actions taken on that basis in a two-year term would be a good continuation of that work and an adequate contribution to the question of verification.

The Chairman: I call on the representative of Canada, who will introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.13.

Mr. Moher (Canada): I can be much briefer this time. Speaking to draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.13, on the role of science and technology in the context of international security, disarmament and other related fields, I wish first of all to state that we recognize fully that this is a sensitive and delicate issue.

Canada and Brazil, as the co-sponsors of this draft resolution, fully recognize this sensitivity and we want to re-emphasize the importance of trying to articulate, in the most widely acceptable way possible, the appropriate relationship between recognition of the importance of science and technology uses and transfers for peaceful purposes and the need to ensure that science and technology are not diverted to non-peaceful purposes. We believe that in achieving that objective — that is, of articulating the widest possible way for that appropriate relationship — constructive dialogues of all kinds are essential.

Resolution 49/68, adopted one year ago, in December 1994, with a vote of 166 in favour, none against and 5 abstentions, already indicates that there was very wide support for these efforts. Canada continues to regard this topic as one of key importance. Our national objective is to secure instruments in this field that are as comprehensive, effective and internationally agreed as possible. As part of that objective, we have tried to promote an ever larger consensus around the ideas addressed in the draft resolution before the Committee.

In cooperation with Brazil, we have worked strenuously this year to find a basis for such a wider consensus and we wish to thank those who helped us in this regard. We believe that we have developed a very straightforward draft resolution, one that invites an enhanced dialogue with a view to two objectives. The first is to ensure implementation of relevant commitments already undertaken under international legal instruments; the second is to explore ways and means of further developing international legal rules on transfers. We consider the draft resolution to be a positive statement of obvious objectives and we believe that it should be universally acceptable.

We have nearly 30 co-sponsors at this point. We call on additional members of this Committee to support it and, obviously, we welcome further co-sponsorship.

Mr. Felicio (Brazil): At the outset, let me thank the delegation of Canada for introducing the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/50/L.13.

The First Committee is now addressing an issue of great concern to Brazil and to other countries interested in disarmament and non-proliferation, especially in the fields related to weapons of mass destruction — nuclear, chemical and biological — and their delivery systems. I am referring to the rules for the transfer of technology with potential non-peaceful applications that can also have important civilian uses. The transfer of dual-use technologies has been the subject of sometimes difficult negotiations in the Disarmament Commission as well as in the context of the

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, among other legal instruments.

Brazil has always considered that the objectives of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and access to advanced technology for peaceful purposes are not contradictory. On the contrary, they may be mutually reinforcing, and this is the approach that has been followed by the United Nations at least since the "Atoms for Peace" initiative and the negotiation of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The objective of the series of proposals Brazil has presented on this matter over the past few years was to call on the international community to keep building upon existing rules and standards, which may play a necessary role, but which also need to be permanently reassessed and improved. Most notably, it is absolutely indispensable to attract more active participation by developing countries in these discussions.

Brazil, together with Canada and other sponsors from both the developed and the developing worlds, is introducing again this year a draft resolution on this item. It is considerably shorter and simpler than resolution 49/68. It takes into account the positions of those countries which, from both sides of the fence, so to speak, expressed reservations about the text approved last year.

The draft resolution before us seeks to preserve the more basic elements of consensus on the issue, while inviting all Member States to enhance dialogue on the role of science and technology in international security. It carefully avoids going into the potentially controversial aspects of the subject. Among other changes, the paragraphs which were voted on separately last year were left out, since this issue is one on which consensus should be our goal. The draft resolution does not endorse, nor indeed criticize, any particular set of measures or international instrument. What it does, in essence, is to encourage all States to renew efforts for broadening international consensus on transfers of high technology.

We are convinced that adoption of this draft resolution and continued dialogue on the role of science and technology in international security are necessary for the international community as a whole. This resolution will keep an important issue on the agenda of the General Assembly and help prepare the way for a more substantive dialogue in the future. We would like to see it approved without a vote, in view of the efforts of the sponsors to eliminate possibly controversial issues from the draft. If consensus should prove to be impossible, we expect that a very large majority will vote in favour of the draft resolution, as in previous years.

Mr. N'Dri (Côte d'Ivoire) (*interpretation from French*): Côte d'Ivoire, along with several other States, is a sponsor of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/50/L.29 entitled "Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them".

The illicit proliferation in small arms in sub-Saharan Africa in general and in the Sahelo-Saharan subregion in particular is today a sad reality, nurtured, *inter alia*, by the emergence of many internal conflicts throughout the continent. The insecurity promoted by the illicit circulation of small arms is increasing dramatically, threatening the stability of our subregion and endangering the emerging democracies in that part of the African continent. The States of the Sahelo-Saharan subregion, on the basis of the results of the two United Nations Advisory Missions sent to the countries concerned, are determined to increase regional cooperation in the strengthening of security.

Côte d'Ivoire intends to take national measures to curb the illicit traffic in small arms, but we are convinced that the support of the international community is vital to the eradication of this scourge. It is for all these reasons that my delegation supports the draft resolution introduced by Mali and requests other States to provide, as they have done at previous sessions, their full support of the draft resolution on assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them.

Mr. Dembinski (Poland): I have asked to speak in support of the four draft resolutions that have just been introduced by Canada: A/C.1/50/L.12 on verification in all its aspects; A/C.1/50/L.13 on the role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament; A/C.1/50/L.14 on the status of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; and A/C.1/50/L.15 on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. My delegation is happy to be among the sponsors of these draft resolutions.

Poland is one of framers of the 16 principles of verification drawn up by the Disarmament Commission and subsequently elaborated by the Group of Governmental Experts on Verification in All its Aspects, including the Role of the United Nations in that area. We believe that the Secretary-General should be commended for his report bringing this study to the attention of the United Nations Member States.

We believe that effective verification of arms control and disarmament agreements is an indispensable component of, and precondition for, confidence that agreements concluded in good faith are indeed scrupulously complied with by all States concerned. Without such trust and confidence, no disarmament agreement can be truly workable. We therefore support the efforts to bring the recommendations set forth in the report to the attention of Member States. We believe that the wide dissemination of knowledge will serve the interests of disarmament and international security.

Poland is a co-sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.13, on the role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament, since we believe that the promotion of progress in science and technology for peaceful applications should be seen as an obligation to make the dividends of disarmament available to all States, especially the developing ones. At the same time, we recognize the need to explore further the ways and means of accomplishing this goal without the risk of such technologies being diverted to other than peaceful purposes.

Like many other members of the Conference on Disarmament, Poland welcomed with satisfaction the important meeting of minds that the ban on the production of fissile material — the "cut-off" — should be addressed by that body and the fact that to this end an Ad Hoc Committee was established with an agreed mandate. Our satisfaction came from our strong conviction that a cut-off agreement would represent another important step towards strengthening the non-proliferation regime and promoting the goals of nuclear disarmament and the ultimate elimination of all nuclear weapons. We continue to believe that negotiations on a cut-off and their successful conclusion would be in the interests of those important overriding goals of the international community.

Last but not least, the Polish delegation, as one of the original sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.14 on the status of the Chemical Weapons Convention, would like to join the representative of Canada in his appeal to all delegations to join in adopting that draft resolution. Its adoption by consensus would constitute a clear message from this Committee concerning the importance that the international community attaches to the effective banning for all time of this category of weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. Brahim (Chad) (*interpretation from French*): My delegation is, naturally, a sponsor of the draft resolution on assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them. As is well known, Chad has experienced many years of conflict and is burdened by the proliferation of small arms. We therefore fully support draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.29, introduced by the representative of Mali.

Once again, we would appeal to the international community to support this draft resolution and to make greater efforts to assist the countries involved to free themselves from these weapons, which pose a constant threat to the civilian population and hamper social and economic development.

The Chairman: I call on the representative of Pakistan to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.39.

Mr. Akram (Pakistan): On behalf of the sponsors I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.39, entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". Paragraph 56 of the Final Document of the first special session, on disarmament states:

> "The most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons." *(resolution S-10/2, para. 56)*

The Final Document goes on to state, in paragraph 57:

> "Pending the achievement of this goal ... the nuclear-weapon States have special responsibilities to undertake measures aimed at preventing the outbreak of nuclear war ..." *(Ibid., para. 57)*

Finally, paragraph 58 states:

> "In this context, all States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider as soon as possible various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear

> war and related objectives, where possible through international agreement ..." (*Ibid., para. 58*)

Since 1978 the General Assembly has asked the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate an international agreement to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It is unfortunate that despite the passage of so many years it has not been possible to reach agreement on an international instrument to provide credible assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. The assurances offered in Security Council resolution 255 (1968), as well as those contained in statements made at the first special session on disarmament, were all conditional and qualified. They offered no guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Although the cold war is over and the impediments of the rival military alliances have been removed, the nuclear-weapon States have yet to provide unconditional, universal and legally binding guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States. This year, prior to the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the nuclear-weapon States made unilateral statements on assurances, which were then incorporated in the form of positive and negative security assurances in Security Council resolution 984 (1995).

I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to recall that the Pakistan delegation has already pointed out the shortcomings of that resolution. First, the statements of four of the five nuclear-weapon States provide only conditional and qualified assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Only the Chinese assurances are unconditional and unqualified. Secondly, the assistance to non-nuclear-weapon States envisaged under the Security Council resolution is subject to multiple veto by the five permanent members of the Council. Therefore, those assurances are not credible. Thirdly, the assurances are not universal but are restricted only to the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT. This is inconsistent with the United Nations Charter, which provides for unconditional and comprehensive security assurances to all States, individually by Member States or collectively through action by the Security Council. Finally, it is unfortunate that the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, was excluded from consideration and finalization of these latest offers of security assurances.

There is widespread support among the non-nuclear-weapon States for the negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament of an internationally binding convention to provide assurances to these States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Group of 21 has expressed its regret in the Conference that the Conference on Disarmament was not able to re-establish its Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Assurances during its 1995 session.

The draft resolution in document A/C.1/50/L.39 endorses these objectives. It recalls the long history of the consideration of this question in the General Assembly and in the Conference on Disarmament. It notes the recent adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and the views expressed thereon. Finally, it recommends that the Conference on Disarmament should actively continue intensive negotiations to reach an early agreement on this subject, taking into account the broad-based support for the conclusion of an international convention.

May I take this opportunity to mention that there is one omission in the text of draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.39. The fifteenth preambular paragraph should read:

> "Taking note of the relevant decision of the Eleventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held from 18 to 20 October 1995 and also ..."

after which the text would continue unchanged with "of the decision adopted by the Tenth Conference" and so on. This was a simple oversight in the presentation of the text. I apologize for it and hope that it will be reflected in the final version of the draft resolution.

It is the hope of the Pakistan delegation that draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.39 will be adopted unanimously by the Committee and the General Assembly.

Mr. Abarry (Niger) *(interpretation from French)*: As this is the first time I have spoken at this session, I should like to begin by congratulating you, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of my delegation, on your election to your high office and on your readiness to work with delegations to bring our work to a successful conclusion.

My delegation wishes to support draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.29: "Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and collecting them". It will be recalled that at the forty-ninth session, on the initiative of Mali, we adopted resolution 49/75 G, on the same question. The draft resolution introduced by Mali today is of even greater importance in the light of the fact that, in implementation of last year's text, the Secretary-General sent a mission to the countries of the subregion, including

Niger. The mission met with highly placed authorities in our countries and was able to assess the volume of the illicit traffic in small arms and the negative impact of such arms on the security of the populations.

The question of curbing the illicit traffic in small arms is of importance to countries in the Sahelo-Saharan subregion because its solution will strongly influence the efforts we are making to achieve development. Convinced, therefore, that other countries in other regions of the world will surely show interest in supporting this initiative, my country has once again this year co-sponsored the draft resolution, which, in substance, repeats the provisions that were approved by consensus last year. My delegation hopes that draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.29 will be adopted by consensus this year as well.

The Chairman: I now invite the Secretary of the Committee to make a statement.

Mr. Kheradi (Secretary of the Committee): I would like to inform the Committee that the following States have become co-sponsors of the following draft resolutions:

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.1/Rev.1: Australia, Bangladesh and Singapore;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.8: Cyprus;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.11: Bangladesh and Hungary;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.12: Bangladesh;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.13: Bangladesh and New Zealand;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.14: Monaco;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.15: Monaco;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.16: Bangladesh;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.18: Ecuador;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.21: Cameroon;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.24: Cuba;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.29: Burkina Faso;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.31: New Zealand;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.32: Bangladesh, Benin and Brunei Darussalam;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.33: Kenya and Brunei Darussalam;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.45: Bangladesh and Benin;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.47: Malawi;

Draft resolution A/C.1/50/L.48: Malawi.

The meeting rose at 4.40 p.m.